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Abstract 
This paper argues that the way in which international human rights treaty systems function can best be 
understood through the lens of experimentalist governance theory.   Drawing on evidence from the 
operation of three UN human rights treaties, namely the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the paper argues, contrary to many conventional depictions of 
international human rights regimes as both ineffective and top-down, that they function at their best as 
dynamic, participatory and iterative two-way systems. Viewing them as experimentalist governance 
regimes brings to light a set of features and interactions that are routinely overlooked or marginalized 
in many mainstream accounts of these systems, and suggests possible avenues for reform of other 
human rights treaty regimes with a view to making them more effective in practice. 
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Introduction 
The disciplines of international law and international relations have long struggled with the difficulty 
of developing or even imagining a legitimate system of transnational governance which could provide 
a minimally satisfactory functional substitute for domestic political systems within states.   On the one 
hand, it is widely acknowledged that however attractive the notion of sovereignty remains to states, 
they are in fact deeply interdependent, and the capacity of separate political communities to govern 
themselves is fundamentally affected by what other political communities do or do not do, as well as 
by flows of capital, commerce, persons and ideas.    On the other hand, despite this deep 
interconnectedness, no adequate system of transnational governing capable of meeting the challenges 
of interdependence has been developed.  International institutions largely lack both the capacity and 
the democratic legitimacy of domestic political institutions, and even the deep experiment in 
transnational polity-making represented by the European Union has revealed all too starkly the 
difficulty of developing a democratically legitimate and accepted form of governance beyond the 
nation state.   
One theory which has been developed in recent years, and which offers some response to the 
dilemmas of transnational governing, is that of experimentalist governance, developed in the work of 
Charles Sabel and a series of other scholars.  Elaborated further below, experimentalist governance is 
in essence a theory of multi-level governance that proposes a way in which policy can be made and 
implemented in a multilevel setting, whether domestically,1 within firms,2 in federal systems,3 or, (in 
more recent scholarship), transnationally.4 Amongst the normatively attractive aspects of 
experimentalist governance theory are its vision of an iterative and participatory system in which 
policies are developed through the interaction of a series of situated stakeholders and actors in 
different locations and at different levels across a multilevel system, operating to implement a broadly 
shared framework, albeit in quite distinct and separate settings.  
In this paper I focus on the UN human rights treaty system 5 and argue that the operation of 
three treaties in particular ‒ the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)– can be understood as instances of transnational experimentalist 
governance.   An analysis of the human rights treaty regime through the lens of experimentalism 
brings to the fore a range of features which are often marginalized or cast as weaknesses in 
contemporary accounts of the international human rights system, and explains how these features can 
operate to strengthen the effectiveness of the human rights system and its goals.    
Further, an experimentalist reading of the international human rights treaty system provides a 
robust response to a number of recurrent critiques of that system.  Academic and policy literature in 
recent years has been harshly critical of the international human rights enterprise in general, and of 
                                                     
1 See e.g. Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf  “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism” (1998) 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 
and C Sabel and William Simon “Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State” (2011) 100 Georgetown 
Law Journal 53. 
2 Gary Herrigel, The Embrace of Experimentalism by Manufacturing Multinationals (2014) 
3 C Sabel and W Simon, “Destabilization Rights”, C Sabel and M Dorf, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”, 
see n.1. 
4 G De Búrca, R Keohane and C Sabel, “New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance” (2013) NYU Journal of International 
Law and Politics,  “Global Experimentalist Governance” (2014) British Journal of Politics, C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, 
"Experimentalism in Transnational Governance: Emergent Pathways and Diffusion Mechanisms" GREEN (Global 
Reordering: Evolution through European Networks) Working Paper No. 3 (2011),  
5 While the international human rights regime overall consists of more than the international human rights treaty system, the 
latter is clearly one of its most important components. Arguably the two other most important elements are the Universal 
Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, and the array of international mechanisms created to respond to gross 
violations of human rights, and particularly the commissions of inquiry. 
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international human rights norms and treaties in particular.6   While such critiques have been advanced 
for many decades,7 their extent and volume in recent years has notably increased. Amongst the various 
criticisms put forward are (1) the ineffectiveness and lack of impact of human rights treaty systems (2) 
the ambiguity and lack of specificity of human rights standards (3) the weakness of international 
human rights enforcement mechanisms (4) the claim to universalism of human rights standards, 
combined with the hegemonic or top-down imposition of human rights standards on diverse parts of 
the world.   
This paper aims to respond to several of those criticisms by first surveying a body of recent 
empirical scholarship on the effectiveness of human rights treaties, and secondly by re-interpreting and 
presenting key aspects of the functioning of those treaties through the lens of experimentalist 
governance.  It begins by outlining how a growing body of recent empirical scholarship challenges the 
‘ineffectiveness’ critique insofar as it identifies a positive correlation, under certain conditions, 
between the adoption of human rights treaties by states and an improvement in human rights standards 
within those states.  Significantly, most of the studies – both quantitative and qualitative – suggest that 
the conditions under which human rights treaties are likely to have this positive impact include a 
degree of political liberalization or democratization within the state in question, and a reasonably 
active domestic civil society.     
Drawing then from evidence of the operation of three specific international human rights 
treaties, namely the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the paper 
argues that an understanding of the international human rights treaty regime as a transnational 
experimentalist governance system helps to highlight important features which are routinely under-
estimated in conventional descriptions and critiques of the system, and to explain how the treaty 
system might work to improve human rights standards within and across states.  Further, when viewed 
through the lens of experimentalism, two key features of the human rights treaty system which are 
criticized as weaknesses – namely the apparent ambiguity in standards and the lack of a strong or 
judicial-type enforcement mechanism – can be seen as important and indeed necessary components of 
a properly functioning system.   
To the extent to which these human rights treaty systems do operate in an experimentalist way, the 
critiques of universalism and of the hegemonic imposition of centrally determined standards are also 
unpersuasive.8   This is because, where these treaty systems operate experimentally, the open-
endedness of their human rights standards and the existence of an active domestic civil society 
facilitates interaction and engagement between locally situated actors who are in a position to 
translate, localize or vernacularize international standards into domestic and local contexts, 9 and 
                                                     
6 Prominent recent critics, as the titles of their works reveal, include Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard UP, 2012),  
Eric Posner, The Twilight of International Human Rights Law (OUP, 2014) and Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of 
Human Rights (Cornell UP, 2014).   
7 Some influential earlier critics include David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?”  
(2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 201, and The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton University Press, 2004), and Martii Koskenniemi “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture” in P. Alston, M 
Bustelo and J Heenan (eds) The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999) and “Human Rights 
Mainstreaming as a Project of Power” (2006), and Makau Mutua Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique , 
(Penn UP, 2008).  For an overview of earlier feminist critiques of human rights, see K. Engle “International Human 
Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting” (1992) 13 Michigan Journal of International Law 517 and, 
more recently, Siobhán Mullally, Gender, Culture and Human Rights (Hart, 2006). 
8 This is certainly not to say that there are no aspects of the international human rights regime that make universalist claims or 
that operate in a hegemonic or top-down way.  The invocation and use by international financial institutions and donors 
of international aid of human rights standards may well at times do so, and forcible humanitarian intervention in alleged 
defence of human rights may also do so.  The focus of this paper, however, is the functioning of the international human 
rights treaty system, (focusing specifically on CEDAW, CRC and CRPD) which I argue in many respects can be 
understood as an experimentalist governance system which is neither hegemonic/top-down nor universalist in its claims. 
9 For elaboration of the ideas of localization and vernacularization, see Sally Engle Merry, Peggy Levitt, Mihaela Rosen and 
Diana Yoon “Law from Below: Women’s Human Rights and Social Networks in New York City” (2010) 44 Law & 
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international actors and institutions which rely for local knowledge, feedback and enforcement on 
them.   The paper argues further that the findings of the empirical studies – namely that there is a 
positive correlation between the existence of an active civil society and the effectiveness of a human 
rights treaty which the state has ratified – bolster the argument that it is the experimentalist functioning 
(even if not the design10) of these human rights treaty systems that helps to account for their positive 
impact.    Understanding the operation of human rights treaties as experimentalist governance may 
also have practical implications about where future research and resources might be directed in terms 
of strengthening the effectiveness of the human rights system in improving the lives of human beings 
across the globe.   
 
The effectiveness of human rights treaties 
A recent critique of the international human rights treaty system argues that the array of empirical 
studies, which have been carried out on a range of human rights treaties using a selection of different 
measurements and methods, do not reveal any consistent results, and that even those which show 
positive results are “cautious in their findings”, such that there can be “little confidence that the 
treaties have improved people’s lives”.11   A closer reading of the various studies, however, indicates 
that they do not actually differ very much, if at all, about the circumstances in which, and the 
conditions under which, human rights treaty ratification correlates with an improvement in human 
rights standards.12  It is certainly true that some of the earlier studies, including those carried out by 
Linda Keith in 199913, Oona Hathaway in 200214 and Emilie Hafner Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui in 
200715 appeared to suggest that treaty ratification does not lead to an improvement in human rights 
performance by states and may even be associated with a dis-improvement in standards.   However, 
various limitations of these studies have been noted, which qualify their findings.16   In particular, the 
(Contd.)                                                                   
Society Review 101,  Sally Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt ‘‘Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global 
Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States’’ (2009) 9 Global Networks 441 and Sally Engle Merry and 
Rachel Stern “The Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong: Theorising the Local/Global Interface” (2005) 46 
Current Anthropology 387. 
10 While the CRPD was consciously drafted in a novel and more broadly participatory way to include features I have 
described as experimentalist (see G. de Búrca “The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’  (2010) 35 
European Law Review 174), the CRC and CEDAW were not originally so designed but have come to develop many of 
these features, including in particular a much more substantial and active role for the relevant civil society groups, 
networks and institutions at all levels of the treaty-body system and its implementation.   
11 E Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights, p 78. 
12 The argument advanced by Emilie Hafner Burton and James Ron in “Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact Through 
Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes” (2009) 61 World Politics 360 to the effect that qualitative studies tend to suggest a 
more optimistic and positive impact of human rights treaties while the results of quantitative studies are more skeptical – 
perhaps implying selection bias on the part of those conducting qualitative studies – has been rebutted by Beth Simmons 
in “From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence of the Spiral Model” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and 
Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights (CUP, 2012), Chapter 3,  and Xinyuan Dai, “The Compliance 
Gap and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions” in Chapter 5 of the same volume, as not being borne 
out by the various studies cited.   Simmons found no relevant difference between the findings of the different kind of 
studies, while Dai pointed to the negative findings of some qualitative studies and the positive findings of some 
quantitative studies.    
13 L Keith “The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human 
Rights Behavior?” (1999) 36 Journal of Peace Research 85 
14 O. Hathaway “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935 
15 E. Hafner Burton and K Tsutsui “Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed 
Most” (2007) 44 Journal of Peace Research 407. 
16 For a critique of the methodology, theoretical framework and policy prescriptions of the Hathaway study see R. Goodman 
and D Jinks “Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties” (2003) 14 European Journal International Law 171.  
Yonatan Lupu, in “The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection 
Effects” (2013) 57 American Journal of Political Science 912 argues that the findings of scholars including Hathaway, 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui that the human rights practices of some states worsened after ratification of the ICCPR and 
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suggestion that there is a correlation between ratification of human rights treaties by states and a dis-
improvement in human rights standards has since then been repeatedly challenged and confronted with 
contrary evidence.17  
Beth Simmons argues that the earlier studies adopt a homogenous approach to treaty 
ratification without either specifying any of the conditions under which states ratified them and 
without differentiating between the types of regime in the states in question.18   Xinyuan Dai points out 
that the findings drawn from the studies suffer from various conceptual and methodological problems, 
including the limitations of the sources used by the authors to measure compliance with rights, the 
failure to distinguish between different kinds of treaty obligations, and differences in the indicators 
used.19 Dai also makes a critique similar to that of Simmons, namely the failure of these earlier studies 
to specify the conditions under which Treaty ratification does or does not have an impact.20  Of the 
apparently different results yielded by a range of empirical studies, she comments that “the “optimists” 
do not believe naively that international human rights law is a magic bullet, but they seek to 
understand the factors and contexts that enable law’s effect. Likewise, the “pessimists” know that 
international human rights law works some times, but not as much as they believe it should. Rather 
than debating over the extent to which international human rights law matters, what is more urgent is 
to first understand why and how and under what conditions should it matter”.21 
A range of more recent empirical studies, which appear to have followed this advice, point to 
a clear correlation between human rights treaty ratification and an improvement in human rights 
standards where there is a reasonably active civil society within the states in question.  Eric Neumayer 
in a 2006 study found that ratification of human rights treaties – including a range of regional as well 
as international human rights treaties – did improve human rights, conditional on the strength of civil 
society and the existence of democratic regimes in the states in question.  In a wide-ranging and 
rigorous book-length study published in 2009, Beth Simmons found that one of the crucial ways in 
which international human rights treaties improved human rights standards – particularly in 
transitional democracies – was their mobilization of domestic constituencies with an interest in 
invoking and enforcing the obligations contained in the treaties.22 These findings have been further 
bolstered by other quantitative and qualitative studies concerning specific human rights treaties and 
(Contd.)                                                                   
the Convention against Torture, and suggests these findings may have been due to insufficient accounting for selection 
effects. 
17 See Christopher Fariss “The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship between Human Rights 
Treaty Ratification and Compliance” (2015) British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.   See also Y.Lupu, “The 
Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects” ibid. 
18 Beth Simmons “From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence of the Spiral Model” in Thomas Risse, Stephen 
Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights (CUP, 2012), Chapter 3. 
19 Xinyuan Dai "The Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions” (2014) 36 Human Rights Quarterly 569.  
Eric Neumayer in “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights” (2005) 49 Journal of 
Peace Studies 925 similarly criticizes the mismatch between the treaties whose ratification was selected for examination 
in these studies and the substantive rights whose protection the studies were seeking to assess. 
20 X. Dai “The Compliance Gap and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions” in The Persistent Power of 
Human Rights, ibid, Chapter 5. 
21 X. Dai, “The Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions” n. 19 above. 
22 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights  (CUP, 2009). See e.g. at p 371, 378: “one of the lessons that follows from 
the research in this book is the crucial role that domestic actors play in their own human rights fate.  Rights stakeholders 
around the world have actively made decisions about when and how to employ the norms contained in human rights 
treaties to influence practices on the ground in their countries. Sometimes they have done this with outside help but the 
locals are the ones who carry the ball and take the risks. They also make decisions about what is culturally appropriate in 
their society and how best to deploy limited resources in order to realize the greatest benefits from the promises of the 
human rights treaties their governments have signed… The most important policy advice that comes from this study.. is 
domestic ownership. Human rights treaties matter where local groups have taken up the torch for themselves”.  
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regions.23 In a time series cross-sectional analysis of CEDAW (which is presented as a least likely case 
given the massive social and institutional changes mandated by the treaty without providing any 
resources or incentives beyond those of other human rights treaties), Neil Englehart and Melissa 
Miller have argued that it is the domestic dynamics set in motion by the process of treaty ratification 
that account for the effectiveness of the treaty in bringing about social change, particular in relation to 
women’s political and social rights.24  Similarly Xinyuan Dai, in a qualitative study of the impact of 
the Helsinki Final Act on the transformation of state behavior and social change within the Soviet bloc 
finds that the crucial factor was the way in which the international agreement strengthened the 
leverage and information of domestic constituencies and activists.   Other qualitative studies which 
reinforce the conclusion that the interaction between domestic constituencies and civil society is 
crucial in explaining the positive effect of human rights treaties include Suzanne Zwingel’s 
comprehensive study of the operation of CEDAW,25 and Jasper Krommendijk’s study of the impact of 
ratification of various human rights treaties in a range of democratic states.26   
Some have described the growing emphasis on statistical measurement in the social sciences 
as an obsession with measurement, and the various limitations of the quantitative studies on the impact 
of human rights treaty ratification have been pointed out. 27  Hariss, for example, argues that the results 
of several quantitative studies are skewed by the failure to take into account the gradual ratcheting up 
of the standards to which states are being held by the operation of the treaty-body system.28  Risse and 
Sikkink point out that statistical surveys of the human rights compliance of states miss out changes in 
the behavior of important non-state actors like large corporations,29 which are important both as 
violators and as potential promoters of human rights.30    
                                                     
23 Daniel Hill in “Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behaviour” (2010) 72 The Journal of Politics 
1161 found considerable variance between the results found in relation to the Convention against Torture on the one hand 
and CEDAW on the other and suggested that more treaty-specific theorizing may be needed: 
24 N. Englehart and M Miller “The CEDAW effect:  International Law’s Impact on Women’s Rights” (2014) 13 Journal of 
Human Rights 22. They find less evidence of positive impact in the case of women’s economic rights.  See also the study 
carried out by Seo Young Cho, “International Women’s Convention, Democracy and Gender Equality” (2014) 95 Social 
Science Quarterly 719, suggesting that the interaction of democracy with the Convention is significant in advancing 
women’s social rights.  
25 S Zwingel How do International Women’s Rights become Effective Domestic Norms? An Analysis of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women PhD thesis, Bochum (2005) and more recently “How Do 
Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspective” (2012) 56 International Studies 
Quarterly 115.  See also the study by Sally Engle Merry of the impact of the CEDAW, looked at in particular through the 
lens of the state reporting system, as well as at the issues on which states resist the impact of the treaty:  “Gender Justice 
and CEDAW: The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women” (2011) 9 Journal of 
Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 49 and “Human Rights Monitoring, State Compliance and the Problem 
of Information”  forthcoming in Simmons and Goodman (eds).  See also the study done by Andrew Byrnes and Marsha 
Freeman The Impact of the CEDAW Convention: Paths to Equality. A Study for the World Bank (World Development 
Report: Gender and Development, 2011). 
26 J Krommendijk The domestic impact and effectiveness of state reporting under UN Human Rights Treaties in the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland (Intersentia, 2014).  In his chapter on CEDAW, the author finds that the 
effectiveness of the ‘concluding observations’ of the human rights treaty bodies are not the result of a compliance pull 
from the committee or treaty body itself, but rather are attributable to the mobilization and lobbying of NGOs and the 
attention given in domestic parliaments to the concluding observations. (p 198).  Similarly, with regard to his findings 
on the CRC and its impact in the Netherlands, he states in his concluding chapter that the effectiveness of the 
concluding observations of the committee of the CRC is to be “attributed to the crucial role of domestic NGOs 
who organized themselves in the Dutch Children’s Rights Coalition”. 
27 Debra Liebowitz and Suzanne Zwingel, “Gender Equality Oversimplified:  Using CEDAW to counter the Measurement 
Obsession” (2014) 16 International Studies Review 362.  They argue in particular that the long slow dialogic nature of 
the change that took place in Colombia in relation to reproductive rights on account of would be missed out by many of 
the statistical surveys. 
28 C Fariss, n.17 above.  
29 For an example of human rights training and compliance brought about by other kinds of non-state actor, see the work of 
the International Rescue Committee in refugee camps:   Y Hutchinson “The Transference of Gender-Based Norms in the 
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Nevertheless, despite these and other limitations of statistical evidence, there is 
unquestionably a growing body of empirical evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, which points 
to the fact that the signing and ratification of international human rights treaties by states which are 
politically liberalized (or in transition towards political liberalization) and have a reasonably active 
civil society is associated with a subsequent improvement in human rights standards in those states.31  
More recent studies argue that this may be true also even in repressive states.32  This body of literature 
confronts the criticism that the human rights treaty system is ineffective, and demonstrates that in 
circumstances where there is some degree of political liberalization and the presence of an active civil 
society, the impact of human rights treaty ratification can be effective in improving life conditions and 
human rights standards in the ratifying states.  
The next section analyses a number of international human rights treaties through the lens of 
experimentalist governance theory.  The paper goes on to suggest that the experimentalist functioning 
of these treaty systems may help to explain the correlation between the effectiveness of human rights 
treaties and the presence of an active civil society identified in the empirical literature outlined above. 
 
International human rights treaties through the lens of experimentalist governance 
(a) Experimentalism as a theory of transnational governance 
The idea of experimentalist governance as a theory of multilevel governance has been introduced 
above.33  Inspired by Deweyan ideas of pragmatic learning from experience, the insights of 
experimentalism have been applied to a range of settings of multi-level governing, including within 
the firm, within federal states, as well as between states within transnational polities such as the EU, 
and more recently in the transnational setting. 
With its central emphasis on the importance of adequate stakeholder participation, 
experimentalist governance theory is premised on the belief that an effective and deliberative system 
of multilevel governing can evolve or be developed where a number of key features are present.   The 
five key features, outlined in earlier scholarship,34 are: 1) initial reflection and identification of a 
broadly shared perception of a common problem, one that is shared across diverse participating units 
or states, resulting in 2) the articulation of a framework understanding with open-ended goals; 3) 
implementation of these broadly articulated goals by contextually situated or ‘lower level’ actors, 
entailing the active participation of key stakeholders who have knowledge of local conditions and 
discretion to adapt the framework norms to these different contexts; 4) continuous provision of 
feedback to the ‘center’ from local contexts and by relevant stakeholders, allowing for reporting and 
monitoring across a range of contexts, with outcomes subject to non-hierarchical or peer review; 5) 
periodic and routine re-evaluation (and, where appropriate, revision) of goals and practices in light of 
the results of the ongoing review and in light of the shared purposes.   
Experimentalist Governance regimes sometimes also operate in the shadow of a background 
system or a threatened sanction which can be called a “penalty default”.  A penalty default is an 
(Contd.)                                                                   
Law Reform Process” (2013) Querelles: Jahrbuch für Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung, 
http://www.querelles.de/index.php/qjb/article/view/6/17  
30 T Risse and K Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights (2012) 
31 See also Courtenay Conrad and Emily Hencken Ritter “Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of 
International Law" (2013) 75 Journal of Politics 397 
32 On how to take account of changes in the repressive nature of a state for the purposes of measuring human rights 
compliance, see Keith Schnakenberg and Christopher Fariss “Domestic Patterns of Human Rights Practices” (2014) 2 
Political Science Research and Methods 1.   See also the argument of Heather Smith-Cannoy, based on both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, that even within insincere and somewhat repressive states such as Tajikistan, Kyrgystan and 
Hungary, the presence of active domestic groups and their use of complaints systems set up under UN human rights 
treaties can lead to important change: Insincere Commitments:  Human Rights Treaties, Abusive States and Citizen 
Activism (Georgetown UP, 2012)  
33 See notes 1-4 above. 
34 This synopsis is taken from G de Búrca, R Keohane and C Sabel “Global Experimentalist Governance”  (2014) British 
Journal of Politics  
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outcome which may serve to incentivize cooperation by applying sanctions in the case of failure to 
cooperate. In the context of the international human rights system, a penalty default might exist in the 
form of a state or states making delivery of aid conditional on compliance with human rights norms, or 
consumer-organized boycotts of goods from countries which seriously violate human rights 
standards.35   
A transnational governance system comprising the five elements outlined – namely general 
agreement on framework goals, broad participation through devolution of discretion in implementation 
to locally or contextually situated actors, with continuous feedback through monitoring and reporting 
to the center, and periodic revision of framework goals in the light of experience gathered through the 
reporting and monitoring process – constitutes an experimentalist governance system. The hypothesis 
of experimentalist governance theory is that where all five of these features are present and operate 
together, they should foster a normatively desirable form of deliberative and participatory governance.   
Experimentalist governance theory thus aims to address the conundrum of how to create an adequate 
and legitimate transnational governance system which takes seriously both the existence of common 
or collective problems shared by states and the deep diversity – of many kinds – of different political 
systems and communities.    It recognizes that transnational governance requires shared agreement on 
broad goals, but simultaneously recognizes that the way these goals are fleshed out and implemented 
will vary – perhaps significantly – from context to context and from state to state.  Experimentalist 
governance theory also emphasizes the importance of stakeholder participation in an informed and 
effective policy, and the importance of ensuring accountability through regular and transparent non-
hierarchical review. 
 
(b) The international human rights treaty system as experimentalist governance 
The UN human rights treaty system began with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and was 
followed by a series of core ‘implementing treaties’ that have been adopted in the decades since.  
There are by now around ten (depending on how they are counted), the main treaties being the two 
Covenants, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.  In addition to these are the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Torture, the International Convention on 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearances, as well as the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD already mentioned above.   
The empirical research on which the argument of this paper rests is based on the latter three treaties, 
which share a set of features common to experimentalist governance processes.36   For present 
purposes, I make no claim about the other treaty systems, although it seems probable that several of 
them share at least some relevant features and aspects of experimentalist governance systems. 
Each UN human rights treaty generally encompasses a set of human rights norms which 
articulate a set of rights focused either on particular communities: women, children, persons with 
disabilities; or on particular issues, whether a broad set of civil and political rights or economic and 
social rights, or a more specific set of issues such as race discrimination, torture or disappearances.  
The treaties usually establish an organ known as a ‘treaty body’. This body is a committee of 
independent experts who – unlike the members who compose the Human Rights Council – are not 
representatives of national governments but are generally nominated and selected because they are 
believed to have relevant expertise on the issues raised by the rights in question and to be independent 
                                                     
35 See for a study, Simone Dietrich and Amanda Murdie “Human Rights Shaming through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery”  
(2015) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641766 
36 Regional human rights treaty systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Human 
Rights system and the African Human Rights system are also not included within the scope of the present paper, although 
some of them share a number of features of experimentalist governance.  For analyses of the ECHR which emphasize the 
open-endedness of standards and the lack of strictly hierarchical or top-down authority see N. “The Open Architecture of 
European Human Rights Law” (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183 and O. de Schutter and F Tulkens “The European 
Court of Human Rights as a pragmatic Institution” in E Brems (ed) Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights (Intersentia, 
2008) 169. 
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from any government or from political interference.37   States are required under the treaties to make 
periodic reports to the treaty body on their progress in implementing the commitments undertaken in 
the conventions, and the treaty body is empowered to make recommendations and address 
observations to the states based on their consideration of the reports. 
Human rights treaty systems feature the five core elements of experimentalist governance in 
the following ways. First, they are premised on a general consensus amongst the signatory states that it 
is important to guarantee protection for this set of human entitlements; second, they articulate a set of 
rights in fairly broad, flexible and general terms on which state signatories have been able to reach 
consensus; third, they allow for significant discretion on the part of states and related actors as to how 
to implement and realise these rights in practice; fourth, they establish a system of periodic reporting, 
monitoring and feedback, under which states are obliged to report regularly on their compliance with 
the obligations undertaken in the treaty, which is followed by a non-hierarchical and formally non-
binding process of review in the form of the treaty-body procedure. This procedure involves a 
specialist committee of experts receiving information, observing, reviewing and making 
recommendations to states in response to reports made to them.   The fifth feature of experimentalist 
governance systems, namely the iterative dimension which allows for periodic and reflexive 
reconsideration and (where appropriate) revision of goals, is less obvious in the context of 
international human rights treaty systems, but there are in fact important elements of iteration and 
reconsideration, as well as revision, within these too.   This will be elaborated in more detail below in 
the descriptions of the functioning of the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD. The other crucial experimentalist 
dimension which has developed in more recent decades and which was mostly absent from the 
original human rights treaties – with the exception of the most recently drafted Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities – is a key role for stakeholders – including civil society actors, 
NGOs, national human rights institutions and other networks – in the process of monitoring and 
reporting to the treaty bodies, and increasingly also in national as well as international monitoring and 
implementation.   
The absence until recently of this important dimension, namely a key role for civil society in 
many aspects of the functioning of the treaty regime, is one of the main reasons why the international 
human rights system has not generally been viewed as an experimentalist system.38  The growing role 
of civil society actors, the emergence of national human rights institutions as part of the treaty-body 
monitoring system, and the creation of transnational and regional networks of NGOS to support the 
treaty-body system has been a fairly gradual development over time, and one which has evolved 
considerably since most of the regimes were first established.39   Indeed, while there is some evidence 
                                                     
37 For overviews and analyses of the treaty system, see H Keller and G Ulfstein, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and 
Legitimacy (Cambridge UP, 2015); S Egan, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Law and Procedure (Bloomsbury, 
2011); M. Cherif Bassiouni and W Schabas, New Challenges for the Human Rights Treaty Machinery (Intersentia, 2011), 
A Bayefsky, Enforcing Human Rights Law: The UN Treaty System in the 21st Century (Kluwer, 2000); P Alston and J 
Crawford (eds) The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge UP, 2000). 
38 For an earlier critique of the human rights treaty body system calling for more active participation for NGOs within the 
treaty-body system and calling for other related reforms, see A Clapham “UN Human Rights Reporting Procedures: An 
NGO Perspective”  In P Alston and J Crawford (eds) The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge 
UP, 2000).  While there is a large body of academic literature on the subject of reform of the treaty-body system, there 
has been only a marginal emphasis on the role of civil society.  See e.g. the single chapter on civil society in a 17-chapter 
book, P Lynch and B Schokman “Taking Human Rights from the Grassroots to Geneva and Back: Strengthening the 
Relationship between UN Treaty Bodies and NGOs”, Chapter 9 in M. Cherif Bassiouni and W. Schabas and New 
Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery:  What Future for the Treaty Body System and the Human Rights 
Council Procedures (Intersentia 2011). 
39 A number of important studies have focused on the growing role of transnational networks of NGOs in promoting human 
rights, e.g. T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights (CUP, 2nd edn, 2013, 1st edn, 1999), 
M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell UP, 1998), and 
E. Hafner-Burton, Making Human Rights a Reality (Princeton UP, 2013). On the growing role of national human rights 
institutions, see R.Goodman and T. Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change (CUP, 2012).  Even 
recent critics of Risse et al’s “boomerang” theory and of the role of international networks and NGOs in shaming and 
mobilizing opposition to a government’s policy, who have pointed to the problems of backlash and corruption that can 
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of a role for civil society being envisaged when the Children’s Rights Convention was being drafted in 
the 1980s40 which was due in part to the unusually central involvement of NGOs in the drafting 
process41 and in the inclusion of the very obliquely worded Article 45 of the Convention,42 the same 
was not originally true for the CEDAW treaty which was adopted a decade earlier, where the drafting 
process was not formally open to civil society groups and partly as a reflection of that fact no 
provision of CEDAW envisages a role for NGOs.43    The same is true for the two Covenants, namely 
the International Covenant for the protection of Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant for the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which are not considered in 
detail in this paper): no initial provision was made for any explicit role for civil society within those 
systems, although such a role has grown up in the context of those two treaties too.44   By comparison 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is the most recent of the UN human 
rights treaties, explicitly and notably builds in a central and active role for civil society, and 
particularly for organizations of persons with disabilities and their representatives.45  
The argument that UN human rights treaties can be seen as examples of transnational 
experimentalist governance is based on information gathered on the operation of three particular 
human rights treaty systems, namely the CRPD, CRC and CEDAW.   Similar research has not yet 
been undertaken in relation to the other UN human rights treaty systems, including the two Covenants, 
although it seems probable that a similar hypothesis about the growing role of civil society in the 
functioning of these regimes could also be advanced. 
A comprehensive analysis of the experimentalist features of the CRPD regime has already 
been provided elsewhere,46 and for the purposes of this paper I will refer to that analysis when 
discussing the CRPD, and will concentrate the more detailed description of experimentalist features 
here mainly on the CEDAW and CRC regimes.  Recall that the five key features are: initial 
identification of a shared perception of a common problem; general agreement on framework goals; 
(Contd.)                                                                   
ensue, have also argued that the backlash problem could be avoided if local actors were more involved, taking ownership 
and leadership of the issue as much as possible, being careful not to be pressurized too much by international actors and 
media at a pace that outstrips and in a way that exacerbates the domestic crisis: see Rochelle Terman, “Backlash: The 
Unintended Consequences of Western Human Rights Intervention” (2013, Democracy Now! 
http://www.democracynow.org/). 
40 Cynthia Price Cohen “The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child” (1990) Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 12 pp. 137-147, and  Joan Fitzpatrick, “United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Toward Adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Policy-Oriented 
Overview” 83 American Society of International Law Proceedings 155, 162 (1989). 
41 In 1983, several years into the drafting process, a number of NGOs aligned to form the NGO Ad Hoc Group on the 
Drafting of the Convention of the Rights of the Child:  see S.N. Hart, “Non-Governmental Efforts Supporting U.S. 
Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” 4 Loyola. Poverty Law Journal 141, 145 (1998). 
42 Article 45 of the CRC provides that the Committee “may invite specialized agencies, [UNICEF] and other competent 
bodies … to provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their 
respective mandates”. 
43 The provision corresponding to Article 45 of the CRC is Article 22, which provides only that “The [UN] specialized 
agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of the implementation of such provisions of the present 
Convention as fall within the scope of their activities. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit 
reports on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities” and makes no 
reference to ‘other competent bodies’. 
44 See A. Clapham, n. 38 above, and Rachel Brett “The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations” 
(1995) XLIII  Political Studies 96 
45 See e.g. G de Búrca, “The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention” (2010) 35 European Law Review 174, 
T. Melish “The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify”, 14 
Human Rights Brief. 37 (2007) and F. Mégret “The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Conception of Rights” 
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 12, No. 261, 2008  
46 See G. de Búrca, R.O. Keohane and C. Sabel, “New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance” (2013) 45 NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics,   723, part III; and G de Búrca, “The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability 
Convention”, ibid.  
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continuous feedback through monitoring and reporting to the center; and periodic revision of 
framework goals in the light of experience gathered through the reporting and monitoring process. 
 
(1) Experimentalist features of the UN human rights treaty systems 
The first two elements are fairly readily visible in the case of most human rights treaties, and certainly 
in relation to each of the three human rights treaties under consideration here.  In terms of the first 
feature, states come together in an intergovernmental conference or under the auspices of the UN 
because a significant number of them believe that it is necessary to provide more specific international 
legal protection for certain vulnerable groups or constituencies such as women, children, persons with 
disabilities.   In other words there is a broad, albeit thin, consensus on the existence of a common 
problem on which a group of states is willing to commit themselves under international law to a 
strategy for addressing the problem.    
In terms of the second feature, human rights treaties such as the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD are 
quintessentially broad agreements on framework goals.  The rights set out in the treaties are expressed 
in broad and open-ended terms which call for considerable interpretation and elaboration in order to be 
implemented in practice.   The key provision of CEDAW, for example, prohibits discrimination 
against women and defines the concept of discrimination in Article 1 very broadly,47 and does not 
actually define the core concept of gender equality on which the Convention is based.  Similarly the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, after setting out a general obligation on states in Article 4 to 
‘undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the 
rights recognized in the present Convention” goes on to stipulate the substantive rights in the very 
broad and flexible terms characteristic of human rights treaties.  Thus for example, to take two key 
provisions, Article 6 provides that “every child has the inherent right to life” and Article 12(1) 
provides that “states parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child”.  In the case of the Convention 
on the rights of Persons with Disabilities, core terms such as ‘disability’ ‘discrimination’ and 
‘reasonable accommodation’ were deliberately defined in broad and open-ended ways.48 
The third and fourth features of an experimentalist system are the devolution of discretion in 
implementation to locally or contextually situated actors, with continuous feedback being provided 
through a process of monitoring and reporting to the center.  Each of these elements is fairly evident in 
the human rights treaty system, since states are left largely to their own devices in terms of the specific 
ways in which they choose to comply with their commitments and obligations under the Conventions, 
and are given broad discretion as to who will be responsible for the implementation of which 
obligations.   The provision of feedback to the center is evident in the institution of the treaty-body 
system and the requirement of periodic reporting, which generally results in a form of dialogue 
between states and the committee members.   However, the crucial development which has imbued 
these third and fourth elements – which could otherwise remain a limited, formalistic and bureaucratic 
exercise – with a distinctly experimentalist flavor is the growing participatory dimension.  Even if the 
CEDAW and CRC treaties, unlike the CRPD, made no mention of civil society in their express terms 
and appear to leave the task of implementation, monitoring and reporting entirely in the hands of the 
signatory states, the reality has become something quite different over time.  
 
(2) The growing participatory dimension of UN human rights treaty systems 
Given the importance of this growing participatory dimension of the human rights treaty system to the 
emergence of an experimentalist regime, the development will be outlined in greater detail here, 
                                                     
47 Article 1 provides that “the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made 
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights an fundamental 
freedoms in the piolitical, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field’.   For a detailed discussion of the drafting of 
the CEDAW, see S. Zwingel, PhD thesis, n.25 above.  
48 For a discussion, see G. de Búrca, n.10 above. 
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before returning to explain how the experimentalist account of the treaty system effectively responds 
to several of the critiques of the human rights system outlined above.  
There is by now a wide variety of actors involved in various ways in each of the three human 
rights treaty systems under consideration, namely the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD, other than the states 
parties to the treaty and the committee of experts which comprises the treaty body.  Four in particular 
will be mentioned here.  First there are non-governmental organizations or NGOs, local, national and 
international.  Second there are transnational coalitions of NGOs, or regional international networks 
which coordinate the engagement of members and others with the treaty-body systems.49  Third there 
are national human rights institutions or bodies,50 and in the CEDAW context there are specific 
gender-related national bodies referred to as National Women’s Machineries.51  Fourth, there are 
international intergovernmental organizations with specific mandates to promote the rights of women 
and children, and which work closely with the human rights treaty systems.  These are UNICEF in the 
case of children’s rights and the CRC,52 and UN Women,53 in particular the Commission on the Status 
of Women,54 in the case of CEDAW.  There is as yet no real analogous organization in the newer 
regime of the CRDP, although UN Enable, run by the secretariat of the CRPD, is a kind of embryonic 
support organization for this regime.55    
There are several key ways in which this array of non-state actors, perhaps most importantly 
the non-governmental organizations and transnational networks, contributes to the experimentalist 
functioning of the human rights treaty system. Four particular roles played by NGOs in 
operationalizing the three human rights treaties under consideration will be outlined here.  
(i) The first and most obvious is the practice of NGOs in providing information to the 
committees during the reporting process.  While formally speaking it is the states which are required 
to produce and submit reports on their performance in terms of compliance with the commitments 
made under the treaties, NGOs have over time become an important additional source of information 
for the treaty bodies.56   NGOs increasingly submit what are termed ‘shadow’ reports to the 
committees, providing alternative sources of information to those of the official government reports 
about problem issues and areas.  Additionally, within those states whose governments are willing to 
work with NGOs, specialized NGOs supply information and feedback to the government in the 
preparation of their official reports.57  Further, the treaty bodies (the committees of experts) 
                                                     
49 In the CEDAW context, the most prominent of these is IW-RAW (International Women’s Rights Action Watch, 
www.iwraw.net), in the CRC context it is CRIN (Child Rights International Network, www.crin.org), and in the CRPD 
context it is the IDA (International Disability Alliance, www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org). 
50 See the 2011 Information Note of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights on National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs) Interaction with the UN Treaty Body System, OHCHR Information Note 2011/411. 
51 These were an outcome of the Beijing World Conference on Women, 1995. 
52 http://www.unicef.org/crc/ 
53 www.unwomen.org 
54 http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw 
55 http://www.un.org/disabilities/ 
56 For critical analysis of the role of NGOs and others in the construction of indicators which are increasingly used to monitor 
and assess the performance of states under human rights treaties including the ICESCR, see Margaret Satterthwaite and 
Ann-Jannette Rosga “Trust in Indicators:  Measuring Human Rights” (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 
253.  See also see Sally Engle Merry “Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance” (2011) 
52 Current Anthropology 583, and “Human Rights Monitoring and the Question of Indicators” in M. Goodale,  Human 
Rights at the Crossroads (Oxford UP, 2014), Chapter 10. 
57 In the UK and Ireland, for example, the Children Rights Alliance NGO plays this role. According to one interviewee 
[CITE]: “The Children’s Rights Alliance is a coalition of participating NGOs which began mainly as a body dedicated to 
gathering expertise and engaging in shadow reporting, has since grown into an organization of NGOs that provide 
expertise and information to states parties in the process of reporting to the committee and working to comply with the 
“concluding observations” of the committee. Working for over 100 national NGOs in Ireland, the coalition has grown 
well beyond its shadow reporting duties and now uses legal expertise to help direct NGOs that provide services on the 
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increasingly hold meetings with civil society actors, including private meetings in advance of the 
hearings they hold with states during the reporting process, as well as public meetings.  More informal 
meetings and discussions also take place between committee members and NGOs.  Such meetings and 
interactions are significant because NGOs are not allowed to make statements during the hearings held 
by the committees with states.  The role of NGOs in bringing information from the ground to the 
monitoring committee is a key one from an experimentalist perspective, and it appears that they play a 
more active role than merely supplying information or identifying issues for the committee, by 
proposing steps that the committee could recommend governments should take to fulfill their 
obligations.58 
(ii) A second role which NGOs have come to play within the three treaty systems is that of 
following up on the committees’ ‘concluding observations’, which represent the outcome of the treaty-
body reporting process.59   Following the dialogic process during which states submit reports 
(alongside the NGO shadow reports) on the performance of their treaty obligations, the treaty bodies 
issue so-called concluding observations which deliver the committee’s assessment of the state’s 
performance as well as recommendations for improvement in relation to implementation of the rights 
in question. NGOs then mobilize to pressurize governments in carrying out the steps indicated in the 
committee’s concluding observations, and organize advocacy and other forms of pressure to 
encourage governments to abide by them.  This regularly includes advocacy for legislative reform, 
using the media to generate publicity and shame, but also bringing strategic litigation seeking rights 
enforcement, and more generally facilitating cooperation between various civic forces that seek to 
implement the committee’s recommendations and observations.   
(iii) A third role carried out by certain NGOs, which has been prominent in the context of 
certain provisions of CEDAW and the CRC, is that of cultural translation.60   For example, in the case 
of Islamic states or states with a significant Muslim population, the role undertaken by NGOs includes 
translating the requirements and provisions of human rights treaties into terms which are more likely 
to resonate domestically and which may have a better chance of cultural acceptance and 
internalization.   NGOs can play a crucial mediating role between domestic social groups and 
international norms and bodies, providing two-way translation.  On the one hand, the CEDAW, CRC 
and CRPD provisions may require appropriate cultural translation to render them useful in protecting 
and promoting the interests of women, children and disabled persons in particular geographic and 
socio-political contexts.  On the other hand, NGOs can provide translation in the other direction also, 
by informing and advising the committee and supplying it with the relevant information and language 
with which to counter arguments made by states who seek to rely on local practice, law or custom to 
justify non-compliance with the Convention.61   This kind of role has been described by anthropologist 
(Contd.)                                                                   
ground, which in turn provide the coalition with information on the gaps in the legislative regime and where the state 
party must be pressured to make reforms”. 
58 See.e.g Suzanne Zwingel’s discussion of the influence of the International Women’s Rights Action Watch, (IRWAW) and 
IRWAW-Asia on the CEDAW committee, in How do International Women’s Rights become Effective Domestic Norms? 
An Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women PhD thesis, Bochum 
(2005), Chapter 8.   And on the ways in which and the extent to which NGOs influence the output of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, see Gamze Erdem Turkelli & Wouter Vandenhole, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Repertoires of NGO Participation, (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 33, 46  
59 See M. O Flaherty “The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies” (2006) 6 Human 
Rights Law Review 27. 
60 See Sally Engle Merry “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle” (2006) 108 American 
Anthropologist 38 and “Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India 
and the US” (2009) 9 Global Networks 441. 
61 To quote from an interview with a spokesperson for the NGO Sisters in Islam: “Where we come in is particularly in 
relation to Article 16 (concerning family life, marriage etc).  Much of the challenge for reporting Muslim countries 
concerns Article 16, given the influence of Sharia law and the Qu’ran.  What we want to do here is to say is that this 
should not give reason to the CEDAW Committee to stop questioning.  Sometimes when the Committee is presented with 
words of this kind (God, Sharia, religion) the Committee does not have any response.  We want to give the Committee 
the language to challenge governments when these arguments are put forward.  We want to expand the arguments they 
can deploy.  What we want to do is to say that, because Islam is being used to inform public policy, we will point out the 
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Sally Engle Merry as a process of vernacularization of international human rights law, which she 
exemplifies by examining the successful use of international human rights law and language by 
indigenous women to challenge female inheritance laws in Hong Kong where the traditional property 
and family norms of indigenous communities barred female inheritance.62 
(iv) A fourth role carried out by NGOs in certain contexts includes the provision of direct 
services to women, children and disabled persons, seeking where they have the necessary capacity and 
resources to fill the gaps identified through the treaty-body mechanism.  This is particularly the case in 
the least developed countries,63 although not only there. 64 
A further important and often complementary set of actors to emerge alongside individual 
NGOs within international human rights treaty systems are transnational coalitions and networks.65 
The functions performed by transnational networks such as IWRAW, CRIN and IDA66 include the 
sharing of information and expertise, the provision of information and training on the treaty-body 
system, mobilizing litigation and other implementation strategies, and bringing relevant groups and 
people in contact with one another.  The role of these networks is particularly significant for states in 
which civil society is weak, and in which there is a lack of access to adequate information. 
CRIN, for example, regularly refers wronged parties ‒ who contact them claiming that a 
government has violated their rights under the Convention ‒ to local organizations that deal with the 
particular issues they raise.67 The network also provides information to individuals and NGOs on the 
requirements imposed by various states for lodging complaints, and brings different national NGOs 
together to exchange information and experience on monitoring the treaty within a particular state. It 
has created general guidelines on how to respond to complaints arising within specific states and has 
attempted to identify which issues are most problematic for particular states. It also maintains a legal 
database of lawyers who are willing to offer their services free of charge and which summarizes how 
the CRC has been treated by national judiciaries, as a resource for domestic groups and individuals to 
use. This information has also been used by CRIN to shape suggestions and recommendations made to 
the committee.  
IWRAW ‒ created in 1985 following the Third World Conference on Women with a view to 
publicize and monitor the implementation of CEDAW ‒ similarly functions as a resource and 
communications center to serve activists, NGOs and researchers internationally. IRWAW sees its role 
as building and supporting capacity amongst NGOs and within the treaty bodies to promote 
accountability for women’s rights.  The organization participates in meetings of the treaty bodies, and 
develops relationships between international NGOs which are concerned with the human rights treaty-
monitoring process and other forms of monitoring.  There are regional and national branches of 
IWRAW, some of which, according to personnel interviewed, see themselves as seeking to influence 
(Contd.)                                                                   
diversity of Islamic jurisprudence on these issues… and the heterogeneity of Islamic culture”.   For examples of this kind 
of cultural resistance by states, see S Engle Merry “Disjunctures between Global Law and Local Social Justice” in  
Human Rights and Gender Violence Chapter 4 , (U of Chicago Press, 2006) p. 103.   
62 See e.g. S. Engle Merry and R Stern “The Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong:  Theorising the Local/Global 
Interface” (2005) 46 Current Anthropology 387:  “Human rights intermediaries put global human rights ideas into familiar 
symbolic terms and use stories of local indignities and violations to give life and power to global movements. They hold 
a double consciousness, combining both transnational human rights concepts and local ways of thinking about 
grievances. They may be local activists, human rights lawyers, feminist NGO leaders, academics, or a host of other 
people who have one foot in the transnational community and one at home. They are constrained by the human rights 
discourse and by the cultural meanings of the situation where they are working.”    
63 See Defence for Children International, National Impact 33 (2013), on their work promoting the implementation of the 
Convention in Angola and Cameroon, and also in middle income countries like Colombia.  
64 Interview with Children’s Rights Alliance on Ireland and the UK 
65 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink were amongst the first to draw attention to the important role of these networks in 
their book Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell UP, 1998).  See also T Risse 
and K Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights (2002) 
66 See n.49 above. 
67 Anna Volz, Advocacy Strategies Training Manual: General Comment No. 10: Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, 
Defence for Children International 3 (2009). 
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and shape the output of the CEDAW committee, while others ‒ particularly within states which lack 
resources ‒ see themselves as primarily concerned with receiving (‘downloading’) the output of the 
committee, and pressurizing for its domestic implementation.  
 
(3) Iteration and revision within UN human rights treaty systems 
In addition to the crucial dimension of stakeholder involvement in the translation of international 
norms to local contexts and in the provision of information from the local to the international level, the 
fifth feature of experimentalist systems mentioned above is the existence of an adequate feedback 
loop; the framework goals and the processes for achieving them are kept open to reconsideration and 
revision in the light of the information gained and the lessons learned in the process of 
implementation.  The possibility of transnational learning from experience and ‘learning from 
difference’ is a major premise of experimentalist governance theory.68 
While this iterative or reflexive dimension is not a prominent feature of the international 
human rights system, there are certain iterative dimensions to the system.  In the first place, there is an 
element of reflexivity in the way in which the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD committees operate; civil 
society actors bring new data and information to the committee, and regularly bring new issues to the 
attention of the committee and the international community.  In the second place, there is within 
CEDAW a broader mechanism of sorts for reflecting on, and revising or updating, the goals expressed 
in the text of the Convention.   One of the ways in which this has been achieved has been through the 
four major International Conferences on Women, which took place in Mexico, Copenhagen, Nairobi 
and Beijing respectively.69  Another way has been through the use of ‘general recommendations’ by 
the treaty bodies.   A key example of this is the issue of violence against women. At the time the 
CEDAW Convention was being prepared, violence against women was not prominent on the 
international agenda.70  However, the CEDAW Committee later effectively incorporated the issue 
through the use of general recommendations.71 Further, the committee has issued at least twenty-eight 
general recommendations on issues not specifically covered in the Convention, e.g.: condemning 
female circumcision;72 calling for equal remuneration for work of equal value;73 concerning 
discrimination based on AIDS;74 on rights of women in marriage and the family;75 incorporating issues 
of maternal health including family planning into Article 12 of the Convention;76 and dealing with 
states’ obligations to migrant women workers.77   The impetus for this kind of revision and updating 
has come from a variety of sources with significant input from NGOs and international bodies.  
                                                     
68 C. Sabel and J Zeitlin “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU”  
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For the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the practice of organizing discussion days78 and 
issuing General Comments79  has also been an opportunity to update and integrate new or more 
specialized issues which have been brought to the committee’s attention even if they were not 
contemplated at the time the Convention was drafted.  Another way of responding to new issues 
arising, and bringing them onto the international agenda, is through the provision in Art 45(c) of the 
Convention, which allows the committee to recommend that the UN General Assembly request the 
Secretary General to undertake a study into a particular issue on its behalf.  Such a request was notably 
made in the case of violence against children.80 It led to the appointment of an expert to conduct a 
study for the Secretary General,81 which led in turn to the creation of a full-time senior UN post, the 
Special Representative on violence against children.82  This was also done in relation to the subject of 
children in armed conflict, where the CRC Committee invoked Article 45(c) and drew in the UN 
Secretary General,83 a process which resulted ultimately in the creation of a similar UN role focused 
on children in armed conflict.84  
And as far as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is concerned, some 
kind of periodic review and reconsideration is facilitated by the fairly novel provision in Article 40 of 
the Convention, which provides that ‘the States Parties shall meet regularly in a Conference of States 
Parties in order to consider any matter with regard to the implementation of the present Convention’.  
While most other international human rights treaties in practice hold a reasonably regular conference 
of the parties without any explicit provision for such being found in the treaty itself, this is generally 
done for purely formal reasons ‒ mainly to elect the members of the monitoring committee and other 
minor housekeeping matters ‒  and substantive matters relating to the treaty are not discussed. By 
comparison, it seems that the annual conference of the CRPD  does entail discussion of substantive 
questions and is actively attended by NGOs and civil society groups.  Further, like the committee 
under the Children’s Rights Convention, the CRPD committee has begun to hold days of general 
discussion on specific issues, most recently on the right to education, as a consequence of the 
information brought to the committee through the rights of persons with disabilities.85 
In sum, the five important elements of experimentalist governance systems are reflected in the 
UN human rights treaty system, and specifically in the three human rights treaty systems examined 
here (CEDAW, CRC and CRPD).  Most significantly, the dimension of stakeholder participation has 
developed prominently in recent decades and has transformed the way in which those systems 
function.86 
 
The implications of an experimentalist governance perspective on the international 
human rights treaty regime 
What are the relevant implications of this experimentalist perspective on these international human 
rights treaty systems?   Three important implications will be outlined here.   
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A first is that it draws attention to, and presents a fuller and more nuanced picture, of the 
operation of UN human rights treaties, and provides a somewhat different causal account of their 
effectiveness, than many existing accounts.   (ii) A second is that it provides a robust response to some 
of the critiques of the human rights treaty system introduced earlier. (iii) Third, it suggests possible 
avenues for reform of these and other existing human rights treaty systems with a view to making 
them more effective in practice. 
An experimentalist perspective on treaty systems such as CEDAW, CRC and CRPD widens 
the lens through which the human rights treaty systems are viewed. It focuses attention beyond the two 
main official sets of actors – state governments and treaty bodies ‒ and beyond the formal engagement 
of the state with the expert committee, to include the growing array of local, national and international 
non-governmental actors and institutions and the way they inform, implement and give shape to the 
regime and to the treaty in practice. Without overlooking the crucial interactions of state actors with 
the treaty bodies, the experimentalist governance perspective also focuses attention on the significance 
of other actors and their activities to the implementation and realization of the norms contained in the 
treaties.  It highlights the way in which the rise and integration of many non-state actors has changed 
the bilateral and formal nature of the inter-state monitoring regime in significant ways: by providing 
alternative sources of information; by ensuring closer understanding of problems on the ground; by 
supplying localized knowledge of particular issues and challenges in different areas and regions; by 
suggesting alternative discourses and ways of supplementing or challenging state reporting; by 
connecting local actors and entities with transnational networks; by building capacity, providing 
training, mobilizing advocacy and proposing practices and strategies to activate change; and by 
proposing, or even in some cases supplying, solutions by providing direct services.  Viewed from an 
experimentalist perspective, the human rights treaty-body system resembles less the critical depiction 
of a distant bureaucratic regime peopled by underfunded and ineffectual committees, and more a 
dynamic regime involving multiple actors and bodies at different levels – local, national, regional and 
transnational – engaged in tackling a wide range of human rights issues, placing neglected issues on 
the agenda, and devising, proposing and sometimes implementing solutions. Through their awareness-
raising, information-sharing, advocacy, service-delivery, vernacularization and two-way translation, 
NGOs, civil society actors and others activate UN human rights treaty systems such as the CEDAW, 
CRC and CRPD and are instrumental in transforming them into more participatory and accountable 
experimentalist governance systems.  
And while there is a richer political science literature – including theories such as the 
‘boomerang effect’ and the role of transnational networks87  ‒ which draws attention to the role of 
domestic civil society and transnational actors in mobilizing for human rights, experimentalist 
governance theory points to the crucially iterative and mutually constitutive relationship between the 
global norm and its local contextualization.  It is not just that human rights treaties become effective 
because international NGOs can supply pressure from outside to prod resistant domestic governments, 
or because local actors can invoke international norms in demanding or advocating for change.    
Rather, the most important dimension is the ongoing interaction between the global and the local with 
each being dependent on the other for the development of the norm and its realization in practice over 
time and in different contexts.  It is not that international norms are gradually sharpened and imposed 
onto the state and the population below, or that local actors make whatever they want of international 
norms in specific settings.  Instead, experimentalism posits that open-ended but important global 
norms only take shape through their implementation in different local contexts by a varied array of 
actors, governmental as well as non-governmental; and that the locally situated actors rely on both the 
impetus supplied, as well as the opportunity for exchange offered, by the periodic engagement with 
the treaty body and its output. Some suggestive examples of this iterative engagement over time are 
provided in the literature, such as the gradual evolution in relation to reproductive rights in Colombia 
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through various cycles of the CEDAW committee process,88 and the acceptance of children’s 
participation in school decision-making in the UK through various cycles of the Children’s Rights 
Committee process.89    
An experimentalist perspective on the functioning of UN human rights treaty systems also 
provides a possible explanation for the findings of the empirical studies surveyed above, namely that 
ratification of human rights treaties has a positive impact on human rights standards within states in 
which there is a reasonably active civil society.  What is it about the existence of an active civil society 
that makes it more likely that a treaty signed by a state will make a positive difference in terms of 
human rights standards?   Experimentalist governance theory suggests that an important way in which 
a transnationally or internationally established set of standards can be effectively implemented is 
through the interaction of locally situated, adequately incentivized, resourced and informed actors with 
an independent center or focal point such as a treaty body, through an iterative two-way process of 
reporting, monitoring and feedback.    
The second relevant implication of an experimentalist perspective on international human 
rights treaty systems is that it provides a robust response to several of the critiques mentioned earlier.   
Those criticisms concerned the ambiguity and lack of specificity of human rights standards, the 
weakness of international human rights enforcement mechanisms, 90 the claim to universalism and the 
top-down imposition of one-size-fits-all standards on diverse parts of the world. 91   
Take first ambiguity.  While critics have decried the open-endedness and lack of specificity of 
the standards set out in human rights treaties, such open-endedness is an essential component for the 
effective operation of experimentalist governance.   Experimentalist premises require the original 
agreement on framework norms to leave sufficient room for local discretion and flexibility in 
application and adaptation to circumstance.  If norms are too prescriptive or too narrow, they are likely 
to thwart the possibility of adjustment to different circumstances and unlikely to give relevant 
stakeholders the necessary room to adapt norms to varying contexts and report back on their results. 
Take secondly the weakness of enforcement mechanisms.  The weakness of human rights 
treaty mechanisms is said to lie in the fact that they provide only a system of self-reporting by states, 
with a soft form of shaming using non-binding treaty-body observations and recommendations which 
are often carefully and diplomatically phrased. Calls have been made by human rights activists, by 
members of treaty bodies, by UN special rapporteurs, and others to acknowledge or confer binding 
authority on the interpretative statements of the UN human rights treaty bodies,92 and to establish a 
world court of human rights.93  It is argued that international human rights norms, unlike domestic 
constitutional norms, are ineffectual without a court which is empowered to resolve ambiguities and 
sharpen authoritative interpretations.94   
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From an experimentalist governance perspective, however, the existence of a court whose 
function is to hand down authoritative and binding rulings on the meaning of specific terms is not a 
necessary element of an effective governance system and indeed could even thwart it.  While courts 
are certainly compatible with experimentalist governance systems, their role is not necessarily to close 
off all ambiguity or to authoritatively resolve issues of interpretation in a single final direction.  
Instead, a court within an experimentalist governance system can be understood as a catalyst for 
reform,95 or as a destabilizer of dysfunctional arrangements.96   Hence the absence of an authoritative 
court or body – such as a treaty body – which could close off the possibility for differential 
interpretation and application in different local contexts of the meaning of a single human rights norm 
is quite compatible with, and even required, by the tenets of experimentalist governance.   Yet the lack 
of such binding, hierarchical enforcement in the human rights domain has met with much criticism and 
the non-binding, discursive nature of the treaty-body system has been the object of complaint.97   
Human rights NGOs, scholars and others have indeed often been highly skeptical of the suggestion 
that a human rights system may not need, or may not be best served, by binding hierarchical 
enforcement.98    What is there, they reasonably ask, to constrain states from adopting whatever 
meaning they like, avoiding any real influence or impact of the obligations they have undertaken to 
protect and promote human rights, and choosing to interpret them in a self-serving way which avoids 
the need for any change? The answer of experimentalist governance theory is that it is the presence of 
an active, engaged array of stakeholders with an interest in enforcing the human rights norm, 
combined with the obligation of regular state reporting alongside stakeholder monitoring and reporting 
back to the center, which provides a fairly robust safeguard against a self-interested interpretation of 
human rights norms by states which seek to avoid action and accountability. What prevents states from 
ignoring their commitments or hiding their noncompliance is the obligation of periodic and regular 
reporting, accompanied by NGO shadow-reporting to an external body which conducts a kind of non-
hierarchical review.  The Treaty bodies engage in dialogue with states; informed by the reports and 
prior participation of NGOs in preparing for the dialogue. They issue recommendations and 
observations on the responses of the states, and these observations and recommendations themselves 
become part of the iterative process by being taken up at domestic level by actors who seek to use 
them to shape change.99 
Take then the objection to the supposedly top-down imposition by human rights systems of a 
uniform standard on diverse parts of the world.  Critics allege that treaty-based human rights norms 
are abstract standards imposed in a uniform way by elites without regard to the diversity of different 
parts of the globe or to the varying needs and wishes of local populations.100   An experimentalist 
account of UN human rights treaty systems, however, rejects the idea of top-down governance as both 
undesirable in principle and unworkable in practice.  On the contrary, each level or layer in a 
multilevel experimentalist system is dependent on the other for the effective functioning of the system 
as a whole, and for the shared goals to be effectively pursued.  The ‘center’ (in this case the 
conference of states which enacted the treaty and the treaty body or committee which is charged with 
monitoring its enforcement) relies heavily on the local or contextually situated actors to adapt, 
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interpret, enact, implement, and report back on the operation of the norms in particular sites and 
contexts.  At the same time the local and intermediate levels rely on the center to ensure ongoing 
scrutiny and reflection on the results achieved in light of information drawn from different contexts 
and sources, and more generally to help promote the transparency and accountability of the system as 
a whole.  The very open-endedness of the framework norms, which are criticized by some as 
hopelessly ambiguous, is important to prevent a centralized top-down approach and to leave ample 
room for adaption to circumstance.    
The third and final implication of an experimentalist perspective on human rights treaty 
systems is that it points to possible avenues for reform of existing human rights treaty systems with a 
view to making them more effective in practice.  Specifically, it is clear that an international human 
rights treaty system requires the integral involvement of locally situated domestic actors, NGOs and 
intermediaries, such as national human rights institutions, as well as the support of transnational 
networks and international bodies that advise and provide information, particularly where domestic 
civil society is weak and lacks access to information.  Adequate channels of communication and 
exchange between the international review body and the array of state and non-state actors are 
necessary.    
It appears, however, that states are growing increasingly resistant to external monitoring of 
their human rights practices and to the involvement of civil society in such processes.  Two recent 
trends illustrate this.  In the first place, human rights NGOs have been under attack in a range of states, 
and not only in states that have been historically the most repressive towards civil society.101  In the 
second place, in recent negotiations over the UN sustainable development goals, a range of states have 
been resistant to allowing the participation of civil society, 102 and in particular have resisted civil 
society involvement in any proposed review and monitoring mechanisms, and have insisted on 
domestic governmental control over the sources and nature of data provided to the review body 
established.103  And while the sustainable development goals (SDGs) scrupulously avoid using the 
language of human rights, the commitments undertaken by states in the SDGs overlap significantly 
with many of their existing human rights commitments.   
These trends could be interpreted as an ominous sign and an indication of the likely future 
marginalization of non-state actors and civil society groups in the international human rights regime, 
but they could also be seen as a reflection of the success and effectiveness of civil society involvement 
in human rights treaty implementation and monitoring.   And while the immediate political climate 
may not appear propitious, the history and record of civil society groups such as human rights NGOs 
suggests that they are resilient and adaptive, and unlikely to disappear as a result of the enactment of 
repressive laws, or to cease their efforts to be centrally involved in human rights treaty 
implementation.   It seems far more likely that NGOs will find alternative ways of organizing and 
operating within repressive states until such time as the political climate becomes less hostile, and that, 
just as in the case of CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child which did not provide 
any role for NGOs or other non-state actors in the human rights regime, civil society groups will 
continue to mobilize and to find ways of acting strategically, and engaging actively, with international 
human rights systems and other overlapping regimes such as the Sustainable Development agenda.   
The argument of this paper is that the effectiveness of those systems in improving human rights 
standards domestically will depend in significant part on the integration and activity of such 
stakeholders within a participatory and iterative system of the kind described above.  
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